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Abstract
Multiple studies in political science consistently hold that left-wing ideology ren-
ders individuals more prone to protest behavior. However, the familiar association
between left-wing ideology and protesting is not empirically corroborated in all
democratic nations. Building on existing theoretical principles and applying them
to diverse political contexts, this paper sheds light on puzzling variation in protest
behavior across new and old democracies. It argues that it is not the left that
engenders protest. Instead, we demonstrate that which political camp engages in
protest behavior depends on its historical legacies and cultural liberalism. His-
torical legacies reflect the ideological configuration at democratization. Protesting
tends to be more common in the ideological camp that opposed the pre-democratic
political order. Simultaneously, it is culturally liberal individuals that more likely
embrace protest participation, independent of their left-right identification. These
theoretical expectations are supported through survey data analyses, explaining
contrasting inter- and intra-regional variation in European democracies.
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1 Introduction
Since the late 1960s and 1970s, protesting has gradually become a widely-approved form
of political participation in democratic regimes (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992, chapter
4; Norris, 2002; Mayer, 2004; Rucht, 2007; Dalton, 2008; Dalton and Welzel, 2014).
However, even though protest activities, such as demonstrations, are overwhelmingly
seen as legitimate today, not all political forces take part in them equally. Research
on established, mostly Western, democracies has repeatedly found that citizens with
left-wing political outlooks are substantially more likely to engage in protest behaviour
than right-wingers (Marsh, 1977; Klingemann, 1979; Barnes et al., 1979; Bernhagen &
Marsh, 2007; Meer, Deth, & Scheepers, 2009; Torcal, Rodon, & Hierro, 2016). Yet, the
reasons for this relationship are disputed in the academic literature. Moreover, studies
from more recent democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)1 have reported a
reversed relationship and the right’s greater propensity to protest (Bernhagen & Marsh,
2007; Kostelka, 2014). Finally, our own empirical analyses that follow reveal striking
cross-country differences within CEE.
This article tackles this puzzling inter- and intra-regional variation. Building on the
literature on Western Europe (WE) (Klingemann, 1979; Inglehart, 1979; Mayer & Per-
rineau, 1992), we formulate an explicit general theory of the relationship between ideology
and protest behaviour. Considering the multi-dimensional nature of political conflict that
can be meaningfully expressed as spanning both economic, and non-economic, cultural
issues, we argue for two complementary ideology-based explanations of protesting. Our
theory is skeptical vis-a`-vis the alleged affinity between protesting and core left-wing
values such as support for redistributive policies and state intervention in the economy.
Instead, we argue that what matters are historical legacies and cultural liberalism. His-
torical legacies reflect the ideological configuration at democratization. Protesting tends
to be more common in the ideological camp that opposed the pre-democratic political
order. Cultural liberalism, with its refusal of traditional social hierarchy, is ideologically
much more congruent with disruptive political actions. Consequently, it is culturally lib-
eral individuals that are more likely to embrace protest participation, regardless of their
left-right affinity.
Our empirical analyses draw on rich data from public opinion surveys, which in total
include over 300,000 respondents. They shed light on the contrasting patterns in protest
behavior across new and old democracies. They demonstrate that it is not the left that
engages in protest behavior, but, in line with our theory, rather those political forces that
participated in the struggle for democratization, and those political forces that are more
1In this article, we interchangeably employ the terms “the East”, “CEE” and “post-communist democ-
racies” when referring to democracies that have a communist past and that are located in Central and
Eastern Europe. Conversely, when speaking of West European democracies that did not know commu-
nism, we refer to “the West”, “WE”, and “Western democracies”.
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culturally liberal. While the effects of these factors overlap in the West, they generate
over-time and intra-regional variation in Central and Eastern Europe.
In Western Europe, protesting is continuously associated with the left. This is because
it was the left which played an important democratizing role both in the early 1900s and in
the 1970s.2 Furthermore, in the West, it is the left that is also consistently more culturally
liberal. At the same time, our analyses demonstrate that it is not left-wing affinity,
but rather cultural liberalism that explains the association. Cultural liberalism trumps
historical legacies, and those right-wingers who are culturally liberal protest significantly
more than culturally conservative left-wingers.
In contrast to Western Europe, in all post-communist democracies, protesting is ini-
tially more strongly associated with the political right as a result of the democratization
processes that were accompanied by protests against the region’s communist dictator-
ships. Nevertheless, the effect of this initial historical context progressively weakens and,
in the second democratic decade, the decisive factor becomes, like in the West, the cul-
tural component of left-right ideology. In those CEE countries where the left is more
culturally liberal than the right, left-wingers become more likely to protest than right-
wingers, thus emulating established democracies. In other CEE countries, where the left
is less culturally liberal than the right, protesting remains more typical of the right.
This article thus contributes to the study of political participation by providing a
theoretical explanation, as well as empirical tests that allow us to disentangle the effects
of different aspects of left-right ideology on protesting. Furthermore, the cross-national
variation we uncover in Central and Eastern Europe strikingly conforms to the ideological
patterns reported by studies on party competition in the region. Therefore, besides pro-
viding insights on the relationship between ideology and protest participation in general,
our findings contribute to a broader picture of the political conflict in post-communist
democracies.
We start by reviewing the existing literature on ideology and protest behavior. Crit-
ically assessing the proposed explanations of the association between left-wing ideology
and protesting in established democracies, we go on to forge a new, not regionally specific
general theory. Applying this theory to diverse political contexts in European countries,
we formulate testable hypotheses that allow us to assess the diverse mechanisms behind
protest behavior more closely. Subsequently, we put our hypotheses to the test using sur-
vey data from the European Social Survey and the European Value Survey in a three-step
empirical analysis.
2The latter period corresponds to democratization in Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal,
and Spain).
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2 Participation in Protests: Theory & Hypotheses
2.1 Literature review
Protest is authority-challenging collective action, such as participating in demonstra-
tions, or signing petitions (Klingemann, 1979). Students of political behavior propose
a considerable number of different, but largely compatible, perspectives accounting for
the variation in individual propensity to protest (see Rucht, 2007 or Mayer, 2010 for an
overview). Among the most influential theories, the relative deprivation model (Gurr,
1970) expects that protesting is driven by the level of citizen dissatisfaction, which cor-
responds to the gap between citizens’ expectations and their perception of the state of
affairs. Alternatively, the resource model (Dalton, 1988; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady,
1995, see also Tilly, 1975) contends that, like in the case of more conventional political
participation, protesters are those who are resourceful in terms of civic skills (mainly
but not exclusively developed through education), money, and time. Furthermore, the
mobilization model (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), echoing the rich literature on social
movements (e.g. McCarthy and Zald, 1977), emphasizes the role of political mobilization,
which can be both direct (by political organizations and social groups), and indirect (by
one’s peers). Finally, a prominent approach explaining the variation in protest participa-
tion concentrates on ideology and political values. It has extensively documented that,
in established democracies, left-wing individuals are substantially more likely to protest
than right-wing individuals (Marsh, 1977; Barnes et al., 1979; Mayer & Perrineau, 1992;
Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Meer et al., 2009; Torcal et al., 2016). The literature proposes
three reasons for this relationship between left-wing ideology and protest.
The first interpretation sees the relationship as a historical legacy (see Mayer and
Perrineau, 1992, p. 139). Since the early beginnings of mass politics in the 19th cen-
tury, the left has used demonstrations, strikes and other types of protest activities in
their fight for political and social rights of the working class. Protest was in fact the
main political tool before the extension of electoral suffrage. Even after enfranchisement,
protest has remained a part of left-wing parties’ “repertoire of collective action” (e.g.
Tilly, 1983), quintessentially exemplified in the May Day Parade, organized by the left
quasi-continuously since 1890 until today, in most established democracies. From this
perspective, the rise of protest participation, triggered by generational change, was natu-
rally more compatible with left-wing political culture, and only more reluctantly accepted
on the right side of the political spectrum.
The second interpretation sees the origins of the relationship in the affinity between
the ideological objectives of the left, and the disruptive nature of protest participation.
The left’s greater openness to unconventional participation tools in the 1960s and 1970s
seems coherent with its aims to change society. In his pioneering account, Hans-Dieter
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Klingemann (Klingemann, 1979, p. 280) hypothesized that “advocates of change in the
direction of greater equality” should be more willing “to incorporate new means of po-
litical participation into their action repertory than the defenders of the status quo”.
He found empirical support for these expectations, and concluded that “leftists, postma-
terialists or social equalitarians exhibit a higher tendency to incorporate new modes of
political participation in their action repertory than do rightists, materalists, or those
people who rank social equality low” (Klingemann, 1979, p. 294). This finding, echoed in
more recent works (e.g., Meer et al., 2009), implies that both economically and culturally
egalitarian attitudes should drive the association between left-wing ideology and protest
participation.
Ronald Inglehart, advancing a similar, but somewhat narrower interpretation, refined
Klingeman’s initial account. Inglehart argues that it is the rise of post-material val-
ues that drives the increase in protest behaviour in established democracies (Inglehart,
1979). According to this interpretation, more post-materialist post-war generations of
citizens put greater emphasis on social, intellectual and aesthetic needs than more ma-
terialist older generations that prefer economic and physical security (Inglehart, 1977).
Post-materialists are more likely to protest since they “have a larger amount of psychic
energy available for politics; they are less supportive of the established social order; and
subjectively they have less to lose from unconventional political action than do materi-
alists” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 92). Since post-materialist issues are typically embraced by
left-wing parties (particularly the new left) and, empirically speaking, post-materialists
tend to be left-wing (Inglehart, 1990, pp. 89-91), this explains the relationship between
left-wing ideology and protest behaviour. Inglehart’s thesis thus “runs counter to the
class conflict model’s postulate” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 93) and insinuates that what mat-
ters for protest participation are not economic, but cultural preferences (see also Hutter
and Kriesi, 2013).
In summary, the proposed explanations of the relationship between ideology and
protest behavior relate to historical legacies, generally leftist policy goals, or cultural
value orientations. They constitute valuable scholarly contributions that are empirically
plausible. However, they also suffer from some significant limitations. First, there are
reasons to suspect that some of these explanations fit a specific historical context, but
may no longer be the driving forces of protest behavior observed in contemporary demo-
cratic societies. Second, and more important, these explanations draw exclusively on the
historical experience from established, mostly Western, democracies and do not offer clear
guidance on what should be expected in other democratic regions with distinct historical
legacies and ideological configurations. In the next section, we critically reassess these
explanations and formulate an explicit general theory that applies beyond the limits of
established democracies.
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2.2 Theory on Ideology and Protest Participation in
Democratic Regimes3
The left-right distinction has been a key heuristic summarizing ideological positions for
both the demand and the supply side of politics (Jou & Dalton, 2017, p. 3). It can
be understood as a “superissue” that encapsulates the “major conflicts that are present
in the political system” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 273). It can be further broken down to two
broad ideological sub-dimensions: economic and cultural (see e.g., Kitschelt 1994).4 Con-
sequently, this article works with three conceptually distinct ideological scales. First, the
general left-right scale is rooted in the historical understanding of political families, with
the left represented by socialist or communist families and later also by the greens, and
the right represented by various liberal, Christian, conservative or radical right families.
We refer to this super dimension simply as the left-right, and label individuals on it
as left- or right-wingers, based on their self-identification on the general left-right scale.
The second scale is the economic sub-dimension, which we consider spanning from statist
economics on the one hand to free-market economics on the other. Finally, the cultural
sub-dimension ranges from cultural conservatism to cultural liberalism. We place individ-
uals on these latter two sub-dimensions based on their economic and cultural preferences.
The way the economic and cultural sub-dimensions associate with the left-right varies
across time (Vries, Hakhverdian, & Lancee, 2013) and space (Marks et al., 2006; Bakker,
Jolly, and Polk, 2012; Rovny and Edwards, 2012; Rovny, 2014), but there is one regular-
ity. In practically all democratic regions, general left-wing attitudes have been associated
with support for reduction of income inequalities (Dalton, 2006, Table 2; Jou and Dal-
ton, 2017, p. 7). Consequently, should the association between left-wing ideology and
protest behaviour apply beyond established Western democracies, the most straightfor-
ward mechanism lies in an affinity between protest behavior and support for redistribution
and state intervention in the economy.
However, the theoretical rationale for such an affinity in today’s democratic world
is weak. Indeed, in the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the
primary political aim of the left was the economic reorganization of society which would
emancipate the working class, a position vehemently contested by the right championing
the status quo. This revolutionary principle, together with the left’s historically limited
3This section focuses on the relationship between mainstream ideological orientations and protest
participation. In addition, protest participation is likely to be positively associated with ideological
extremism (Meer et al., 2009; Torcal et al., 2016), where, however, the driving force may not be the nature
of ideological orientations (both the extreme left and extreme right protest) but, rather, the willingness to
overthrow the existing political order (i.e. extreme political dissatisfaction). Political ideology may also
intervene in the short-term effect on the propensity to protest through the ideological distance between
citizens and the political incumbents. We take these factors into account in our empirical analyses below.
4The scientific literature shows that these two sub-dimensions may account for positions on addi-
tional issues such as European integration (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, &
Edwards, 2006) or populism (Polk et al., 2017).
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ability to pursue its interests through established institutional avenues, induced the left
towards greater protest behavior.
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether it was the preference for greater economic equality
and redistribution per se that induced the protest behavior of the left. It is more likely
that the historical linkage between the left and protesting resulted rather from support
for revolutionary political change. The key mechanism triggering protest was possibly
not the search for equality, but rather relative deprivation, dissatisfaction, mobilization
capacity (through left-wing organizations), and experience with such actions from the pre-
enfranchisement era. In fact, in contrast to the cultural ideological dimension discussed
below, there is nothing inherent in the economic dimension that makes citizens natural
proponents or opponents of protest behavior. Support for or opposition to redistribu-
tion is conceptually unrelated to different forms of political participation. Redistribution
supporters may be more favorable to protesting based on their personal situation (e.g.
personal resources, trade union membership) but, when these factors (relative depriva-
tion, mobilization) are properly controlled for, differences in protest behavior based on
redistribution preferences are theoretically unlikely.
Furthermore, the revolutionary content of left-wing ideology has been significantly
blunted since the class compromise of the post-war era (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, Huber,
and Stephens, 1992). Today, the principle of economic redistribution lacks revolutionary
flavour, and is generally accepted and practiced by both the left and the right, who
usually disagree only on the desirable degree of redistribution and state intervention.
Consequently, if there was a strong association between economic preferences and protest
behavior in the past, it is unlikely that it still holds in contemporary democracies. This
implies that left-wingers’ greater propensity to protest, observed in the West, is not a
default situation in all democratic regimes. Instead, the relationship between ideology
and protest behavior is likely to depend on alternative factors: historical legacies and
cultural value orientations.
As suggested by scholars studying established democracies, the most salient historical
legacy for protest behavior is likely to form in the democratization stage, when demo-
cratic regimes are founded and political identities are shaped. Demonstrations, petitions
and other types of protests organized by the opposition often accompany democratic
transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 58; Huntington, 1991). These events typi-
cally legitimize the narrative of a popular uprising against illegitimate, authoritarian rule.
They become closely associated with the political identity of the democratic camp, which
may be either left- or right-wing. It is the left when the outgoing dictatorship is right-
wing (e.g. Southern Europe in the 1970s), and the right when the collapsing dictatorship
is left-wing (e.g. CEE after 1989). In general, protest behavior can be expected from
those political forces that have historically lacked the ability to proceed via meaningful
conventional political channels, consequently mobilizing disruptive actions to voice their
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grievances. However, this historical legacy is presumably strongest in the first democratic
years and is likely to decay over time as other factors come to cross-pressure and weaken
it.
In contrast to economic preferences, cultural liberalism is conceptually related to
protest behavior.5 This ideological dimension taps issues such as civil liberties and toler-
ance of ethnic and sexual minorities. Cultural liberals refuse the idea of “natural” social
hierarchies. They focus on freedom and representation of individuals and subgroups that
have been marginalized by entrenched social and political conventions and institutions.
They value individual rights and emancipation over rigid social rules. Consequently, they
represent a logical fit for authority-challenging activities, including protest. On the con-
trary, cultural conservatives adhere to political and social conventions. They champion
traditional societal order and respect for authorities, including the state’s repressive ap-
paratus. For them, engaging in activities that are disruptive, that question legitimate
institutions and established conventions, and that often result in conflict with the state
and its agents, is less ideologically congruent. Cultural conservatives are, therefore, much
less likely to protest than cultural liberals.6 The affinity between cultural liberalism and
protest behavior has implications for the differences in the left’s and right’s propensity
to protest. Depending on how cultural attitudes associate with the left-right continuum,
either of the two ideological camps may embrace protest participation.
To recapitulate, there is reason to believe that the relationship between left-right
placement and protest behaviour is neither universal, nor direct. The difference between
the left and the right in terms of protesting depends on two factors: which of the two
camps was the pro-democratic challenger at the time of democratization, and which of
the two camps is culturally more liberal. Since the former factor is a legacy, which may
be gradually overlaid with new experiences, it is likely to play the greatest role shortly
after democratization. In time, it is, at least partially, cross-pressured by the latter, more
direct, effect of cultural liberalism.
2.3 Hypotheses: Regional Variance in Protest Propensity
In this section, we apply our theory to contemporary European democracies, turning to
the particular political contexts in different regions of Europe – East and West – and also
within these regions. This focus provides us with variance in terms of the theory’s two
main driving factors – historical legacies and cultural liberalism – allowing us to generate
testable hypotheses about the relationship between ideology and protest behavior.
5This argument is largely compatible with Ronald Inglehart’s thesis discussed above. However, it
does not emphasize specific post-material values or characteristics of post-material individuals. Instead,
it refers to more general ideological principles of cultural liberalism (e.g. Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et al.,
2002).
6Our theory is clearly probabilistic. This is even more so given that most citizens do not hold perfectly
coherent and structured sets of ideological beliefs (Achen and Bartels, 2017, p. 36).
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In light of our theory, there are compelling reasons to concur with the existing research
and expect that, in Western Europe, it is indeed the left that protests more than the right.
In the West, it was primarily the left that organized and represented disenfranchised social
strata prior to and during democratization in the late 19th and early 20th century, or that
opposed right-wing dictatorships in Southern Europe in the 1970s. At the same time, in
all West European democracies, economically statist outlooks and cultural liberalism are
generally and uniformly positively correlated (Marks et al., 2006; Bakker et al., 2012).
With the rest of the literature, we thus expect a strong and consistent association between
left-wing identification and protest across western Europe.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): In West European democracies, protest participation is much stronger
among left-wingers than among right-wingers.
The hypothesized association should be driven by cultural liberalism, which exerts
more direct effect than the democratization antecedents. Consequently, it should be the
case that cultural liberals have greater propensity to protest, independent of their left-
right identification. We thus expect that culturally conservative individuals who identify
with the left protest less than culturally liberal individuals who identify with the right.7
Furthermore, if cultural liberalism is the strongest predictor of protesting, this should
not apply only to Western Europe but also to other democratic regions.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the fall of communism, often precipitated by sig-
nificant citizen involvement and mass demonstrations (Kuran, 1991), led to high levels
of protest participation at the beginning of the democratic era. In the following years,
however, protest participation, together with political participation in general, declined.
This was considered by some a temporary corollary of economic hardships, triggered
by post-communist transformation, and labelled as a “post-honeymoon effect” (Ingle-
hart and Catterberg, 2002).8 Nonetheless, post-communist citizen engagement in protest
activities remains moderate, and significantly lower than in Western democracies (Bern-
hagen and Marsh, 2007; Kostelka, 2014; Vra´bl´ıkova´, 2014). Besides the transformational
difficulties of the region, the low degree of political involvement in CEE has been blamed
on communist (or even pre-communist) attitudinal legacies (Jowitt, 1992; Miller, 1992;
7This is in contrast to most of the literature. One potential exception is Federico, Fisher, and Deason,
2017 who, however, do not study ideology but authoritarianism, which is a personality trait. They find
that, in terms of political interest and political participation in general, authoritarianism has a negative
effect on left-wingers but not on right-wingers. In contrast, we focus on ideology suggesting that cultural
conservatism has a negative effect on both left-wingers’ and right-wingers’ protest rates.
8Regarding the decline, it should be noted that Mason (1995) found that, in terms of demonstrations,
participation was limited even during the democratic transitions, except for countries where the regime
change took form of a revolution: East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria (Romania was not included
in his study). This matches recent findings on more conventional forms of participation. For instance,
Kostelka (2015, 2017) found that the revolutionary democratization context is one of the main causes of
the strong post-communist decline in voter turnout.
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Sztompka, 1993, 1996, see also Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2013), weak associational mem-
bership (Letki, 2004); strategic divide and pacify policies by post-communist decision-
makers (Vanhuysse, 2006); or corruption and bad governance (Hooghe and Quintelier,
2014).
Although citizens in post-communist democracies are less involved, their protest par-
ticipation resembles that of their Western counterparts in other respects. For example,
protesting is positively correlated with support for democracy and tolerance (Ekiert and
Kubik, 1998; Gurin, Petry, and Crte, 2004; Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka, 2006,
p. 10), and it is complementary (and not substitutive) to more elite-directed political
and electoral participation (Novy´, 2014; but see Taˇtar, 2015). Similarly, like in estab-
lished democracies (Dalton, 2008), young citizens are more likely to prefer more direct and
active “engaged forms of citizenship” to a more passive and conventional “duty-based”
forms (Coffe´ and Lippe, 2010). More generally, Bernhagen and Marsh (2007, p. 65) draw
on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data and conclude that the in-
dividual predictors of protest participation (i.e. resources, attitudes and mobilization)
are roughly the same both in CEE and in Western Europe (see also Barnes and Simon,
1998). Nevertheless, they find an intriguing difference between the two regions in terms
of the effect of ideology:
“It is noteworthy that holding a right-wing worldview has a significant effect
on protest participation of roughly equal magnitude in both regions, but in
opposite directions: while being right-wing tends to reduce a person’s protest
activities in the west, it provides a slight boost to the number of activities re-
ported by respondents in the east. Likewise, while left-wing ideology provides
the single most important individual-level determinant of protest activity in
the west, it is unrelated to protest in the east.” (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007,
p. 61)
Bernhagen and Marsh go on to argue that the East-West discrepancy has to do
with “differences in meaning and interpretation between the established versus the post-
communist democracies as to what left and right is all about” (Bernhagen and Marsh,
2007, p. 61). However, they do not develop this line of thought further. A similar find-
ing, but in a bi-variate setting, is also observed by Kostelka (2014), who, in contrast to
Bernhagen and Marsh, suggests that the difference between CEE and WE may relate to
the socialization impact of regime change in the post-communist region.
The idea that the meaning of the left-right in the CEE differs from Western democ-
racies is widely held. This difference, however, stems not from the meaning of what is
economic left, or what is cultural liberalism, but rather from the associations between the
two, economic and cultural, outlooks (e.g.: Kitschelt, 1992; Marks et al., 2006; Vachudova
and Hooghe, 2009). The economic, as well as the cultural, component of left-right is com-
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parable across the regions. Both Western and Central and Eastern European economic
statists support greater government involvement in the economy and greater redistri-
bution (e.g. Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2010; Rovny, 2015).9 Similarly, cultural liberals
across Europe advance political and social pluralism, and individual choice. However,
while in Western Europe economic statists tend to be consistent proponents of cultural
liberalism, that is not the case in the East. Recent research (Rovny and Edwards, 2012;
Rovny, 2014, 2015) points to the heterogeneity in the associations between economic and
cultural preferences across CEE – a fact that we use to our analytical advantage when
testing the divergent effects of economic and cultural preferences on protest participation.
Our first historical legacies argument does not refer to the cultural sub-dimension but
to the left-right distinction in general. It emphasizes the divergent historical experience
of CEE. While, in WE the pre-democratic political order was defended by the right, in
CEE the political status quo was represented by left-wing communist dictatorships. It
was thus the predominantly right-wing pro-democratic opposition forces that engaged in
protests to put pressure on communist authorities, which ultimately led to regime change.
Consequently, protest participation entered the right-wing political repertoire in the early
post-communist era. Indeed, “it makes senses that the repertoires that were available to
people before 1989 should be available for further use after 1989” (Kopstein, 2003, p. 241).
Even if left-wing ideology naturally favors protest participation as suggested by some, the
relationship between left-wing ideology and protest participation was thus presumably
radically different from that in the West in the first years after democratization. We
expect that left-wingers were less likely to protest than right-wingers.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Unlike in Western democracies, left-leaning individuals in the CEE
were less likely to protest than right-leaning individuals in CEE in the early democratic
years.
Our second ideological argument underlines the importance of cultural preferences.
As mentioned above, the association between economic and cultural views is more het-
erogeneous in Central and Eastern Europe when compared to Western Europe. While in
some CEE countries economic statism is associated with culturally conservative views,
in others, economic statists espouse cultural liberalism.
9In terms of public policies, Tavits and Letki, 2009 found that, despite their fiscally conservative dis-
course, post-communist right-wing governments effected higher public expenditure than their left-wing
counterparts between 1992 and 2004. Nevertheless, Careja and Emmenegger, 2009 analyzed similar data
as Tavits and Letki, and came to the opposite conclusion (left-wing governments spent more). Addi-
tionally, the significance of partisan differences in terms of fiscal policies is disputed also in established
democracies (Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1993; Clark, Golder, and Golder, 2002) or new democracies in Latin
America (Fairfield and Garay, 2017). We would contend that some ‘right-wing’ governments in CEE
earn that name not due to their economic programs, but primarily due to their cultural conservatism
(see footnote 10 for details on Poland and Hungary).
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Past explanations attribute this diverse competition structure to the role of state-
building and ethnic politics (Rovny, 2014, 2015). The argument rests on two proposi-
tions. The first considers the competitive opportunities stemming from post-communist
state-building. Three communist federations (Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yu-
goslavia) crumbled in the early 1990s, giving rise to a number of newly independent states.
In countries that were peripheral republics of these federations, federal collapse precipi-
tates the formation of local political forces that oppose communism both on economic,
and on national grounds. These political forces espouse pro-independence, nationalist
and anti-communist positions, thus associating free-market economics with cultural con-
servatism. On the contrary, in the federal centers, or in unitary states, it is the communist
forces that turn to ethno-nationalism as a way to revive their compromised ideology, while
the opposition champions economic and cultural liberalism. Here the association between
economic and cultural preferences is thus reversed with the free-market forces adopting
culturally liberal values.
The second mechanism forming political competition structure in Central and Eastern
Europe relates to ethnic politics. In some countries, politically dominant ethnic minorities
originate from past federal centres (such as Russia or Serbia). These groups are conse-
quently associated with the political left (for detailed explanation of this association see
Rovny, 2014). Here the economically statist left parties espouse the group interests of
ethnic minorities, and champion culturally liberal policies that protect minority rights. In
other countries, ethnic minorities stem from other backgrounds, and consequently do not
have any particular association with the political left. Here the economic statists tend to
ignore or scapegoat ethnic minorities, who seek support from economically free-market
parties, or from explicitly ethnic parties that, nevertheless, tend to cooperate with the
political right.
These two mechanisms overlap to create a particular structure of political competi-
tion in each country of the region. Table 1 outlines the various possibilities. Quadrant
A in the table contains countries that were federal peripheries, and that are home to
significant domestic minorities from the ex-federal center. Here it is the statist left that
espouses cultural liberalism, while the right champions free-market economics combined
with national conservatism, reproducing a competition pattern typical for Western Eu-
rope. Quadrant B contains countries that were either federal centers, or unitary states.
Here economic statists espouse cultural conservatism, while the free-market forces sup-
port cultural liberalism.10 Finally, quadrant C contains mixed cases. Both Lithuania
10A word of caution is warranted at this point concerning the political patterning of Hungary and
Poland. These countries are highly ethnically homogeneous, and consequently were not affected by
domestic ethnic politics (extra-territorial Hungarian ethnics, nonetheless, play an important political
role). The structure of competition in these countries was framed by the reformist nature of the Hungarian
and Polish communist parties, which negotiated a gradual transition away from communist dictatorship,
and transformed themselves into modern, cosmopolitan socialist parties in the early-mid 1990s, during
which time they supported economic transition (Grzymala-Busse, 2002). While the competition pattern
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and Slovakia were communist federal peripheries, and their break-away from the federal
center enabled their left-wing parties to espouse a certain degree of cultural liberalism in
the initial state-building period. However, since the dominant ethnic minorities in these
countries do not come from the federal center – the dominant ethnic minority in Lithuania
are the Poles, while the dominant ethnic minority in Slovakia are the Hungarians – there
is no explicit association between these minorities and the political left. Consequently,
the left is not naturally driven to champion ethnic minority rights. We thus expect mixed
results in the countries of quadrant C.
Table 1: Explaining the Structure of Political Competition in Central & Eastern Europe
Dominant ethnic minority
from federal center
Other or insignificant
ethnic minorities
Federal center
or unitary
state
B
Eastern pattern:
Liberal right
Bulgaria
Czech R.
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Federal
periphery
A
Western pattern:
Liberal left
Croatia
Estonia
Latvia
Slovenia
C
Mixed pattern
Lithuania
Slovakia
Note: Adapted from Figure 5 in Rovny, 2014.
This variation in the political patterning in CEE countries provides us with an ideal
environment to test the theoretical proposition that protest behaviour is associated with
culturally liberal views, independent of economic outlooks. We expect that culturally lib-
eral political forces are more likely to promote, among their supporters, political action
beyond electoral participation. The most responsive are presumably those supporters
who are themselves culturally liberal and open to protesting. Therefore, the strongest
propensity to protest should be observed among liberal left-wingers in quadrant A coun-
tries, and liberal right-wingers in quadrant B countries.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): In those CEE countries where left-wing ideology is associated with
cultural liberalism (quadrant A in Table 1), left-wing individuals are more likely to protest
than right-wingers. In contrast, in those CEE countries where left-wing ideology is cultur-
ally conservative (quadrant B in Table 1), left-wing individuals, are less likely to protest
than right-wing individuals.
in Hungary and Poland was initially fluid, by the end of the 1990s, the right-wing opposition settled on
protectionist, nationalist, and in the case of Poland, Catholic, positions. These culturally conservative
forces, however, espouse economic statism, recreating a pattern associating economic statists (represented
by these conservative organizations) with cultural conservatism, while pro-market forces (represented
primarily by the liberals) are culturally liberal. For details, see section “Political Patterning in Hungary
and Poland” in the Electronic Appendix.
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3 Data and Methods
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. We first study the relationship between
left-right ideology and protest behavior using aggregated data from WE and CEE over
time. Subsequently, we turn to country-specific analyses of this relationship within each
region. Finally, in the third step, we explore the meaning of left-right attitudes both in
WE and in CEE.
To study the evolution of the relationship between ideology and protest behavior over
time (Step 1), we use two types of survey data. The European Value Survey (EVS;
EVS, 2015) conveniently comprises three time-points that cover the first post-communist
decades: the early 1990s (Wave 2, data collected between 1990 and 1993), the turn of
the 1990s and 2000s (Wave 3, 1999-2001) and the late 2000s (Wave 4, 2008-2010). The
European Social Survey (ESS; ESS, 2016), which started only in the early 2000s (we use
the waves of 2002, 2008 and 2012),11 has the advantage of covering protest behaviour
over a clearly defined period: the last 12 months preceding each wave.12 We run logistic
regressions in which the dependent variable is reported protest participation. Following
earlier studies (e.g. Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Jakobsen and Listhaug, 2014; Stock-
emer, 2014), the variable is dichotomized and coded as one, if respondents report having
participated in least one of the two protest behaviours: signing a petition or demon-
strating.13 As is typical in the scientific literature (e.g. Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007;
Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2010), we operationalize left-wing ideology through a dummy
variable based on respondents’ self-placement on the left-right scale.14 We discuss below
and show in the Electronic Appendix that using alternative continuous operationalization
of ideology, or setting ideological extremists apart yield the same substantive findings.
To test Hypothesis 1, we interact the left-right dummy with EVS/ESS waves to assess
whether the regression coefficient changes over-time. In addition, we control for country
differences in protest behavior through country dummies. For ease of presentation and
11Not all countries unfortunately participate in all ESS waves. The three waves we choose allow to
compare the largest identical set of East European countries at different points in time.
12In the EVS, no time frame is given. Respondents are asked whether they have ever taken part in one
of the studied protest activities. Since, in some cases, respondents may not remember their past protest
behavior or subconsciously use a specific time frame when answering the question, the EVS protest
variable needs to be interpreted with caution.
13The combination of the two items in a single measure presupposes that the two items constitute a
single latent dimension of protest participation (Quaranta, 2015, chapter 2). To test this assumption
empirically, we conducted a Mokken scale analysis (Mokken, 1971). The results fully support our empir-
ical strategy. For each country under study, the scalability coefficient H for a scale combining petitions
and demonstrations is superior to 0.3 in both the EVS and ESS datasets. Please, note that our principal
results hold when, instead of our preferred dichotomous operationalization, we use an additive scale that
varies between 0 and 2 or when we analyze demonstrations and petitions separately. We show these
robustness checks in the Electronic Appendix.
14The scales range from 1 to 10 (EVS) and 0 to 10 (EES) and left-wing respondents are thus who
position themselves on 1 to 5 and 0 to 4 respectively. In the ESS analyses, the left-wing dummy is
complemented with a centre dummy (to compare the left to the right), which corresponds to value 5 on
the left-right scale.
13
interpretation, we estimate separate models for the West and for the East.15 In this and
the following analyses, we apply the survey design weights as recommended in the EVS
and ESS codebooks and robust standard errors.16
In the next step (Step 2), we explore the variation within the two regions. We first
conduct an analysis of the West and the three sub-regions of the East summarized in
Table 1: those with the Western, Eastern, and mixed patterns of party competition.
Subsequently, we break down the analysis by individual countries. Given its analyti-
cally advantageous, clearly defined, time frame (last 12 months) and dense coverage of
the recent period (surveys conducted periodically every two years), we employ the ESS
(waves 1-7). The dependent and main independent variables are the same as in Step 1.
However, in addition to country and ESS wave dummies, we also control for the effects
of resources (gender, age, education, interest in politics),17 dissatisfaction (satisfaction
with democracy)18 and mobilization (membership of a trade union or “similar organiza-
tion”).19 In addition, we include a variable Ideological opponent of the incumbent that
captures whether there is a difference between the respondent’s ideology and the colour
of the incumbent cabinet. The variable draws on the Parlegov dataset (Do¨ring and
Manow, 2016), which uses the 0-10 left-right scale to classify political parties and which
we merged with the ESS data. We matched all ESS respondents with their countries’
cabinet(s) that governed in the 12 months preceding the ESS interview. The ideologi-
cal position of each cabinet is the average position of all the constitutive parties on the
left-right scale weighted by their seat share in the lower (or only) chamber of national
parliament.20 The resulting dummy is coded as 1 if the cabinet’s position clearly dif-
fers from that of the respondent.21 We expect that individuals whose ideology is clearly
non-congruent with that of the incumbent cabinet are more active protesters (e.g. Meer
15This way, we always compare the Western left to the Western right and the Eastern left to the
Eastern right. Simultaneously, the slopes of all included variables may differ between the East and the
West. If, instead, we used a single model, this could be achieved only through a multitude of interactions
whose interpretation is much less intuitive for non-linear regression models (e.g. Ai and Norton, 2003;
Mood, 2010; Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd, 2012).
16As we include country and survey wave fixed effects and do not expect heterogeneous treatment
effects (i.e. we divided the sample into groups of countries based on expected heterogeneity in the
treatment effect), clustering of standard errors is not justified (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge,
2017). This being said, we show in the Electronic Appendix that the use of clustered standard errors
yields the same substantive findings.
17Variables Age and Education correspond to the number of years of age and years in full time education
respectively. We use dummy variables to operationalize gender (Female) and different levels of interest
in politics (Very interested, Quite interested, and Hardly interested).
18The variable Democratic satisfaction is a scale that varies from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10
(extremely satisfied).
19The variable TU member is coded as 1 for trade union members and 0 for non-members.
20If two or more cabinets governed during the 12-month period, we use their average ideological position
weighted by their respective duration.
21We code the dummy as one for left-wingers, right-wingers and centrists when the cabinet’s position
is higher than 5, lower than 5, or not in the 3.5-6.5 interval respectively. We opt for these cutting
points since they allow to identify clear non-congruence between respondents’ and cabinets’ ideological
positions. However, using alternative operationalizations leads to similar results.
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et al., 2009; Torcal et al., 2016).
Finally, the exploration of left-right attitudes (Step 3) is executed in two stages.
First, we incorporate cultural liberalism in the analysis of protest behaviour to ascer-
tain whether, as hypothesized, it drives the relationship between left-right attitudes and
protesting. The measure of cultural liberalism is a continuous scale that combines atti-
tudes on immigration and attitudes towards gays and lesbians, and which varies between
0 (the most culturally conservative) and 1 (the most culturally liberal).22 Second, we run
an OLS regression to find out how left-right attitudes (the dependent variable) relate to
cultural and economic stances (the independent variables). The former corresponds to
cultural liberalism and the latter to support for redistribution, which also varies from 0
(no support) to 1 (full support).23 All descriptive statistics are available in the Electronic
Appendix.
4 Findings
4.1 Ideology and Protest Participation: Aggregated Analysis
Over Time
To assess the relationship between ideology and protest participation we start out by
analyzing data spanning more than two-decades of post-1989 politics, demonstrating
temporal consistency in Western Europe, and over-time variance in the East. Figure 1
presents the results of the logistic regression of the EVS and ESS data24 in terms of the
predicted probability to protest.25 It reveals two striking differences between the West
and the East.
First, as reported in the existing literature, protest participation is substantially
stronger in the West than in the East regardless of ideological orientation (or survey
used). Second, the impact of ideology on protest participation is also different. In the
West, left-wing individuals’ probability to engage in protest activities was by approxi-
22The measure is an additive Likert scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.6) that combines the standardized
versions of the three following variables from ESS: imueclt (“Country’s cultural life undermined or
enriched by immigrants”), imdfetn (“Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from
majority”), and freehms (“Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish”). We rescaled the index to
make it vary between 0 and 1.
23Support for redistribution is measured via responses to the statement “The government should take
measures to reduce differences in income levels.” We recoded the variable so that it varies from 0 (strong
disagreement) to 1 (strong agreement).
24Full results are available in the Electronic Appendix (EA) in Tables EA1 & EA2.
25The predicted probabilities are calculated using the average marginal effects (AME), which indicate
average changes in the probability of the outcome that result from a one-unit change in the independent
variable and that are estimated across all observations. In the calculation of an average marginal effect,
the observations keep their original values on all other independent variables (Bartus, 2005). Contrary
to logit coefficients, AME are intuitive and, more importantly, they can be compared across models and
samples (Mood, 2010).
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Effect of Ideology on Protesting 1990-2012 (EVS & ESS)
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mately 12 percentage points higher than that of right-wing individuals in both datasets.
This left-right gap in protesting remained strong and remarkably stable throughout the
period at hand, as predicted by Hypothesis 1. In contrast, in the East, the relationship
between ideology and protesting evolved over time. In the early 1990s, it was exactly
the opposite of the Western pattern. In line with the historical legacy account (Hypoth-
esis 2), left-wing individuals were roughly 9 percentage points less likely to protest than
right-wing individuals. Nevertheless, later on, the gap disappeared. In all the post-early
1990s surveys, the difference in the propensity to demonstrate between the left and the
right in post-communist countries was substantively negligible, and statistically generally
insignificant.
The non-emergence of a clear Western-type association between ideology and protest-
ing invalidates the conventional expectation that left-wing ideology naturally connects to
protest behavior. It raises a question whether ideology has no discernible26 impact on
protest participation in the East, or whether, as Hypothesis 3 suggests, the aggregated
analysis conceals heterogeneous patterns of the relationship that co-exist in the region
(and cancel out in the aggregate). We explore this in the next sub-section.
4.2 Ideology and Protest Participation: Intra-Regional
Variation
We now turn to address the relationship between ideology and protest participation within
each region, demonstrating its homogeneity across the West, and heterogeneity across the
East. At this stage of the analysis, to control for potential cross-pressures that would
conceal the effect of ideology, we include all the control variables relative to resources,
mobilization, dissatisfaction, and the political color of the incumbent in addition to the
ESS wave and country dummies. We first analyze the four groups of countries suggested
by Hypothesis 3 (the West and the three sub-regions in the East) and, subsequently, each
country separately.
Table 2 and Figure 2 present the results of the aggregated analyses and strongly
support Hypothesis 3. They show that, in the West, even when the control variables are
included, left-wingers are still much more likely to protest than right-wingers. But, in
the East, there is variation in the effect. Left-wingers participate more in protests than
right-wingers in CEE countries with the Western pattern of party competition (CEE-WP
countries), they participate less in Eastern pattern countries (CEE-EP countries), and
there is no statistically significant difference in mixed cases (CEE-MP countries). As an
aside, the direction of all the other associations is similar in the West and East although,
26The absence of an observable relationship does not necessarily mean that ideology does not mat-
ter. The effect of ideology may simply be cross-pressured by some of the other factors that also affect
participation and that we include in the following analyses.
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Table 2: Ideology and Protest Participation (ESS 1-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West East: WP East: EP East: MP
b b b b
Left-wing 0.45∗∗∗ 0.15∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Center 0.09∗∗∗ -0.15∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.09
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Female 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.06 0.10+
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 1.36∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.09) (0.16)
Quite interested in politics 0.98∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
Hardly interested in politics 0.51∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
TU member 0.32∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
Democratic satisfaction -0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04 0.08+ 0.02
(0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Constant -2.21∗∗∗ -3.46∗∗∗ -3.83∗∗∗ -2.32∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.20) (0.15) (0.25)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163830 16279 33781 10714
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.06
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
in the latter region, some of them lack statistical significance. For instance, those citizens
who are younger, more educated, more interested in politics, dissatisfied with the way
democracy works in their country, or ideologically opposed to the incumbent cabinet tend
to protest more.
We replicated the present analysis for each country in turn and present the results in
Figure 3.27 In the West, without a single exception, left-wingers always have a stronger
propensity to protest than right-wingers. The same is true of CEE-WP countries (Esto-
nia, Croatia, and Slovenia). However, in the two CEE-MP cases (Lithuania and Slovakia),
there is not a uniform relationship and, in the CEE-EP countries (Bulgaria, Czech Re-
27Given the large number of estimates, we opt for a scatter plot design instead of the bar plot in Figure
2.
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Figure 2: Ideology and Protest Participation by Sub-Region
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Figure 3: Ideology and Protest Participation by Country
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Note: The figure displays the results of the analysis from Table 2 replicated by country (for detailed
results, see Tables EA3 to EA5). Average marginal effects with 95 % confidence intervals. Positive
values indicate that left-wingers protest more than right-wingers.
public, Hungary, and Poland), the opposite is true: right-wingers protest more than left-
wingers. This provides systematic evidence in favour of Hypothesis 3.28 In the Electronic
Appendix, we present additional robustness checks of models from Table 2 including al-
ternative operationalizations of the left and the right (continuous left-right scale or special
categories for ideological extremists), separate analysis for each type of protest behaviour,
and alternative estimation strategies. All of them yield the same substantive findings.
4.3 Meaning of Ideology: The Role of Cultural Liberalism
The previous sub-section confirmed that there are distinct groups of post-communist
countries that strongly differ in terms of the effect of left-right ideology on protest partic-
ipation. We now explore whether the difference is due to cultural liberalism as Hypothesis
3 suggests.
We focus on the three main types of countries from the previous analyses (Western,
CEE-WP and CEE-EP). We proceed in two stages. In the first analysis, presented in
Table 4, we assess whether cultural liberalism predicts protest participation. To do so,
we add the continuous variable Cultural liberalism and its interaction with the left-wing
dummy to the models presented in the previous sub-section.29 This interaction term
operationalizes the possibility that the relationship between ideology and protesting is
conditioned by the broader context of political competition (see also Federico et al.,
2017). It reflects our expectation that culturally liberal right-wingers are more active
protesters than culturally conservative left-wingers. We expect that that the effect of
cultural liberalism is stronger for those individuals whose positions reflect the ideological
clustering in their respective political system. For ease of interpretation, we plot the
results from Table 4 in Figure 4.
The figure shows that in all three types of countries cultural liberalism is positively
associated with protesting. What differs is, however, how cultural liberalism interacts
with left-right ideology. In Western Europe and in CEE-WP, the slope is significantly
steeper (i.e. the effect on protesting is stronger) for left-wingers than right-wingers. In
those countries, culturally conservative left-wingers are not more but less likely to protest
than their right-wing counterparts that are equally conservative. This reveals that the
positive effect of left-wing ideology in Western Europe and in CEE-WP is mainly driven
by cultural liberalism.
28In Poland and Estonia, the average marginal effect is not statistically significant at the conventional
levels (though by a relatively short margin, p<.17). We believe that this is probably due to a smaller pool
of protestors in those countries (approximately 11 % of each country’s sample) when compared to the
other post-communist countries where the relationship is significant (15 % of protestors on average). This
difference in the overall degree of protest activity means that, with the same sample size and the same
intensity of the relationship between ideology and protesting, the probability to observe no relationship
by chance is significantly higher in Poland and Estonia than in the other countries.
29For parsimony and easier interpretation, we removed centrists (those who scored 5 on the continuous
left-right scale) from the analysis.
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Table 3: Left-Wing Ideology, Cultural Liberalism and Protesting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
West East: Western Pattern East: Eastern Pattern
b b b b b b b b b
Left-wing 0.44∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.09 -0.74∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.22) (0.05) (0.05) (0.15)
Left-wing × Cultural liberalism 1.38∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 0.55∗
(0.10) (0.36) (0.26)
Cultural liberalism 1.63∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.47+ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.28
(0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (0.27) (0.14) (0.18)
Female 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.08+ 0.07 0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 1.41∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Quite interested in politics 1.04∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Hardly interested in politics 0.57∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
TU member 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Democratic satisfaction -0.03∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant -2.26∗∗∗ -2.85∗∗∗ -2.41∗∗∗ -3.66∗∗∗ -4.09∗∗∗ -3.66∗∗∗ -3.72∗∗∗ -3.96∗∗∗ -3.84∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 110944 110944 110944 9563 9563 9563 23005 23005 23005
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Figure 4: The Effect of Cultural Liberalism
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In contrast, in CEE-EP, the difference in the positive effect of cultural liberalism on
protesting between the left and the right is much smaller.30 In those countries, liberal
right-wingers participate as much as liberal left-wingers and, therefore, cultural liberalism
does not overcome the effect of the democratization legacy that is favourable to right-
wingers’ protest participation.
In the Electronic Appendix (Table EA12 and Figures EA1 & EA2), we present ad-
ditional analyses using, instead of the dichotomous left-right distinction, the continuous
left-right scale31 and support for redistribution. The results remain substantively the
same. First, they confirm the contrasting patterns between WE and CEE-WP on the
one hand, and CEE-EP on the other. Second, they validate the greater propensity to
protest of culturally liberal right-wingers (who oppose redistribution) when compared
with culturally conservative left-wingers (who support redistribution).
So far, we have learned that cultural liberalism is the key driver of the relationship
between ideology and protest behaviour in all regions. What remains to be explained is
why it interacts more strongly with left-wing ideology in WE and CEE-WP countries, and
less so in CEE-EP countries. Hypothesis 3 expects that this is due to different patterns of
political competition and clustering between economic and cultural ideological attitudes.
While in WE and CEE-WP countries, the left should be culturally more liberal, in CEE-
EP it should be more conservative. We explore the validity of this expectation through
OLS regression analyses presented in Table 5, which regress the continuous left-right
scale32 on cultural and economic attitudes. The odd models test a linear version of the
relationships (Models 1, 3, 5) while the even models (2, 4, 6) allow for a curvilinear
function by adding a squared form of cultural liberalism and support for redistribution.
Both model specifications support Hypothesis 3. While left-right ideology is strongly
positively correlated with support for the reduction of income inequalities everywhere,
the association with cultural liberalism varies. According to the linear models, the left-
right scale is negatively correlated with cultural liberalism in Western Europe, as well
as in CEE-WP countries. In contrast, the relationship between the left-right scale and
30The difference in the slope becomes statistically and substantively insignificant when Hungary is ex-
cluded from the analysis (see the results of an additional analysis plotted in Figure EA3 in the Electronic
Appendix). In Hungary, cultural liberalism plays an ambiguous role, which is unparalleled in any other
country. While, like in most other countries, cultural liberalism boosts protest-participation among left-
wingers, it decreases participation among right-wingers. As a result, among culturally liberal individuals,
it makes no difference for protesting whether once is left-wing or right-wing. However, among culturally
conservative Hungarians, right-wingers protest much more than left-wingers. Culturally conservative
right-wingers are, in fact, the most active group. This is presumably due to the augmented activism of
radical right groups, which, among other actions, emulate the mobilization of paramilitary militias and
extremist groupings from the interwar period. In the graphic representation of EP countries in Figure 6,
Hungary’s idiosyncratic relationship reduces the slope of the effect of cultural liberalism on right-wingers
and, in consequence, makes look the effect stronger on the left.
31It could be objected that the interaction effects in Table 4 may translate the position on the left-right
scale (as ideology is operationalized through a dummy variable). Our replication with the continuous
left-right scale demonstrates that this is not the case.
32For presentation purposes, we divide the original 0-10 left-right scale by 10.
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Table 4: Analysis of Left-Right Scale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West East: Western Pattern East: Eastern Pattern
b b b b b b
Reduce inequality 0.173∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.014)
Cultural liberalism -0.273∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ 0.092 0.028∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.018) (0.011) (0.051) (0.009) (0.038)
Reduce inequality × Reduce inequality -0.024∗∗∗ 0.012 0.070∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.025) (0.017)
Cultural liberalism × Cultural liberalism -0.408∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.048) (0.036)
Constant 0.578∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 168730 168730 16841 16841 35098 35098
R2 0.115 0.121 0.045 0.047 0.035 0.036
Note: OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
cultural liberalism is positive in CEE-EP countries. Both the magnitude of the regression
coefficients from the odd models, and the visualization of the results from the even models
presented in Figure 5 demonstrate that the relationship between the left-right scale and
cultural liberalism is the strongest in the West and the weakest in CEE-EP countries. In
the latter group, cultural liberalism discriminates relatively weekly in terms of left-right
ideology. This clarifies why, in most of these countries, cultural liberalism has a similar
effect on protest participation of both left-wingers and right-wingers. On the contrary,
in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent in the CEE-EP countries, the relationship
is strong, presenting more coherent ideological packaging of the economic and cultural
dimensions. Consequently, the association between cultural liberalism and protesting is
much more natural on the left than on the right.
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Figure 5: Left-Right Ideology: Economic and Cultural Attitudes
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Note: Based on Table 4. 95 % confidence intervals. The orientation of X-axes ensures that, in the
West, culturally liberal and economically redistributive attitudes match left-wing positions on the
left-right scale.
5 Conclusion
This article addressed the relationship between ideology and protest participation in es-
tablished and new democracies. By extending our sample beyond established democracies
to countries with more diverse ideological patterning, the article disentangles three argu-
ments proposed by the prominent works in the field: one focusing on historical legacies,
one on general left-right ideology, and one on cultural liberalism. While these coincide
in Western Europe, where the left historically challenged the established order, while
furthering economic egalitarianism and cultural liberalism, they differ across Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. By bringing these cases into the analysis, this article highlights the
particular role of historical legacies and the cultural domain as the driving mechanisms
for protest participation in old and new democracies alike.
Our theory and analyses demonstrate that it is not the left, primarily defined in eco-
nomic terms, that engenders protest. Instead, we isolate the importance, and complemen-
tary role of two remaining ideology-related factors: historical legacy, which principally
reflects the initial context in which protest participation emerged, and cultural liberalism.
First, in terms of historical legacy, our findings show that those forces that chal-
lenge the pre-democratic order and bring about democratization become associated with
protest activity. In the East, with its historical legacy of democratization from communist
dictatorship, protesting is positively associated with right-wing ideology in the early years
of democracy – an outcome we attribute to the right’s role in opposing communist rule.
Over time, the role of this historical legacy nevertheless weakens, and the cultural compo-
nent of left-right ideology comes to the forefront as the decisive ideological factor behind
protest participation. In the West, the two factors overlap and protest participation has
been consistently and strongly positively associated with left-wing ideology thanks to
the left’s historical association both with alternative forms of political participation, and
cultural liberalism.
Second, cultural liberalism is the primary driver of protest participation. In those
countries where cultural liberalism associates with the left, protesting is more common
among left-wingers, be it in the West or in the East. In those post-communist democra-
cies, where cultural liberalism is not associated with the left, but (albeit more weakly)
with the right, cultural liberalism preserves the initial effect of the historical legacy and
right-wingers participate in protest more than left-wingers.
With these analyses, the present article contributes to our understanding of individ-
ual political behavior, by underlining the ideological basis of protest participation. It
provides a general theory of the ideology-participation nexus that can be applied to other
democratic regions.
This article also underlines the importance of dimensional considerations that unpack
the meaning of the general left-right divide. It shows that considering the particular
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packaging of economic and cultural issues may be of vital importance not only for party
competition but also for political participation.
Finally, this article provides further documentation of ideological structuration of East
European politics and the importance of historical legacies (e.g. Kitschelt, Mansfeldova,
Markowski, and Toka, 1999; Ekiert and Hanson, 2003; Wittenberg, 2015; Pop-Eleches and
Tucker, 2017). Far from being a tabula rasa (Kitschelt, 1992), East European politics have
been, and continue to be underpinned by consistent ideological patterning. While in the
early years of post-communist democracy it was the (anti-communist) right that tended
to fuel political protests, later years gave way to political protest being associated with
culturally liberal outlooks, no matter which side of the political spectrum espoused them.
Protest participation in the East and West is thus continuously ideologically enveloped.
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1
Table EA1: Evolution of the Effect of Ideology on Protesting 1990-2010 (EVS)
(1) (2)
West East
b b
Left-wing 0.60∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05)
EVS wave 1999-2001 × Left-wing -0.06 0.47∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07)
EVS wave 2008-2010 × Left-wing -0.07 0.57∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
EVS wave 1999-2001 0.33∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
EVS wave 2008-2010 0.29∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Constant -0.40∗∗∗ -0.94∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Country dummies Yes Yes
Observations 52683 37279
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.07
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.West : Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Iceland, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden. East : Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
2
Table EA2: Evolution of the Effect of Ideology on Protesting 2004-2012 (ESS)
(1) (2)
West East
b b
Left-wing 0.62∗∗∗ -0.11
(0.09) (0.15)
ESS wave 4 × Left-wing -0.18 -0.07
(0.11) (0.21)
ESS wave 6 × Left-wing 0.02 0.09
(0.08) (0.23)
Center -0.04 -0.41∗∗
(0.05) (0.15)
ESS wave 4 × Center 0.01 -0.18
(0.06) (0.13)
ESS wave 6 × Center 0.02 0.08
(0.05) (0.05)
ESS wave 4 0.08+ 0.06
(0.05) (0.10)
ESS wave 6 -0.05 0.11
(0.05) (0.23)
Constant -1.20∗∗∗ -1.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.11)
Country dummies Yes Yes
Observations 65265 24908
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. West : Belgium, Switzerland, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden.
East : Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.
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4Table EA3: Ideology and Protest Participation by Country (West 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Austria Belgium Switzerland Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Great Britain
b b b b b b b b b
Left-wing 0.57∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Center 0.16+ 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.23∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.22∗∗ -0.02
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Female 0.18∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 1.55∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
Quite interested in politics 1.10∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Hardly interested 0.59∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
TU member 0.27∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.04 1.08∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06)
Democratic satisfaction -0.03∗ -0.00 -0.01 -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.03∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideological opponent of the incumbent cabinet 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.12+ 0.09+
(.) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Constant -2.34∗∗∗ -1.88∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗∗ -2.69∗∗∗ -1.10∗∗∗ -1.65∗∗∗ -1.56∗∗∗ -1.80∗∗∗ -1.93∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6469 10397 9582 17063 9398 8419 12200 10929 12626
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.07
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
5Table EA4: Ideology and Protest Participation by Country (West 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Greece Ireland Island Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Sweden
b b b b b b b b b
Left-wing 0.82∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.30+ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.07) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05)
Center 0.01 -0.03 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12+ 0.02 0.01 0.18∗∗
(0.14) (0.06) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.14) (0.06)
Female 0.17+ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.30∗ 0.04 -0.08 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.05) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
Age -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 2.12∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.70∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.09) (0.32) (0.22) (0.23) (0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (0.10)
Quite interested in politics 1.21∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.38 1.24∗∗∗ 0.43∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.08) (0.29) (0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09)
Hardly interested 0.53∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.07 0.70∗∗∗ 0.13 0.61∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.24 0.51∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.08) (0.30) (0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.09)
TU member 0.73∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.35∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.06) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04)
Democratic satisfaction -0.07∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.06+ -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.02+ -0.02 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Ideological opponent of the incumbent cabinet -0.12 0.00 0.16 -0.11 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.23∗ 0.06
(0.12) (.) (0.16) (0.13) (.) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04)
Constant -3.31∗∗∗ -1.46∗∗∗ -0.02 -2.10∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗ -3.17∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ -3.68∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.17) (0.48) (0.32) (0.44) (0.19) (0.16) (0.31) (0.15)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7107 11712 1058 2698 1893 12061 10267 8863 11088
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.04
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
6Table EA5: Ideology and Protest Participation by Country (East)
Western Pattern Eastern Pattern Mixed Pattern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Estonia Croatia Slovenia Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Lithuania Slovakia
b b b b b b b b b
Left-wing 0.14 0.41∗∗ 0.20+ -0.33∗ -0.12+ -0.72∗∗∗ -0.14 0.17 -0.07
(0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.13) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18) (0.08)
Center -0.29∗∗∗ 0.07 -0.07 -0.50∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ 0.19 -0.18∗
(0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.20) (0.09)
Female 0.30∗∗∗ -0.03 0.25∗∗∗ -0.10 0.12∗ -0.00 0.07 0.35∗ 0.01
(0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07)
Age -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 1.42∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.23) (0.15) (0.26) (0.18) (0.36) (0.17)
Quite interested in politics 1.22∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.63∗ 1.03∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20) (0.10) (0.24) (0.15) (0.25) (0.14)
Hardly interested 0.62∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.45∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.21 0.51∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.09) (0.24) (0.15) (0.23) (0.14)
TU member 0.52∗∗∗ 0.27+ 0.29∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.56∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.27) (0.11)
Democratic satisfaction 0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03+ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.01 -0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Ideological opponent of the incumbent cabinet 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.25∗ 0.03 0.20+ -0.09 0.03 0.01
(.) (.) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) (0.08)
Constant -4.60∗∗∗ -2.85∗∗∗ -2.51∗∗∗ -4.03∗∗∗ -2.66∗∗∗ -4.04∗∗∗ -4.23∗∗∗ -3.25∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.38) (0.28) (0.35) (0.24) (0.34) (0.25) (0.54) (0.24)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7588 2166 6525 5770 10138 8691 9182 3744 6970
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.04
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table EA6: Replication of Table 2: Continuous L/R Scale
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West East: WP East: EP East: MP
b b b b
L/R scale -0.10∗∗∗ -0.02∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Center -0.13∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.08
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Female 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.06 0.10+
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 1.36∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.09) (0.16)
Quite interested in politics 0.98∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
Hardly interested 0.52∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
TU member 0.32∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
Democratic satisfaction -0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.11∗∗∗ 0.06 0.08+ 0.01
(0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Constant -1.53∗∗∗ -3.27∗∗∗ -4.26∗∗∗ -2.34∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.21) (0.15) (0.25)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163830 16279 33781 10714
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.06
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table EA7: Replication of Table 2: Demonstrations Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West East: WP East: EP East: MP
b b b b
Left-wing 0.94∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.16
(0.03) (0.14) (0.08) (0.18)
Center 0.24∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.60∗∗∗ -0.11
(0.03) (0.11) (0.09) (0.19)
Female 0.01 -0.10 -0.33∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.02) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14)
Age -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Very interested in politics 1.67∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 0.77∗
(0.05) (0.19) (0.14) (0.34)
Quite interested in politics 1.03∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗
(0.05) (0.18) (0.12) (0.29)
Hardly interested 0.43∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.27
(0.05) (0.18) (0.12) (0.28)
TU member 0.56∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.28
(0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.22)
Democratic satisfaction -0.05∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.05∗∗ -0.05+
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.09∗∗∗ -0.18 0.14+ -0.10
(0.02) (0.14) (0.08) (0.18)
Constant -3.72∗∗∗ -4.78∗∗∗ -3.77∗∗∗ -4.31∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.37) (0.24) (0.56)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163736 16256 33731 10701
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.03
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
8
Table EA8: Replication of Table 2: Petitions Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West East: WP East: EP East: MP
b b b b
Left-wing 0.39∗∗∗ 0.11 -0.25∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Center 0.08∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.09
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Female 0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.12+
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 1.30∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.09) (0.16)
Quite interested in politics 0.95∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.10) (0.08) (0.13)
Hardly interested 0.51∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.03) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
TU member 0.30∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
Democratic satisfaction -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.10∗∗∗ 0.05 0.06 0.03
(0.01) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Constant -2.38∗∗∗ -3.67∗∗∗ -4.22∗∗∗ -2.42∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.21) (0.16) (0.25)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163342 16249 33726 10669
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.07
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table EA9: Replication of Table 2: Cumulative Scale (DV = Petitions + Demonstrations)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West East: WP East: EP M4
b b b b
Left-wing 0.45∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ -0.27∗ -0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.13) (0.08)
Center 0.09∗∗∗ -0.16 -0.42∗∗ -0.10
(0.02) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12)
Female 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.05 0.10
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.13)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Very interested in politics 1.36∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.15) (0.14)
Quite interested in politics 0.98∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.18) (0.16)
Hardly interested in politics 0.51∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.13)
TU member 0.33∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.04)
Democratic satisfaction -0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.04∗∗ -0.04∗
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04 0.08 0.02+
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01)
Constant -2.22∗∗∗ -3.45∗∗∗ -3.83∗∗∗ -2.33∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.48) (0.20) (0.43)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163248 16226 33676 10656
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.06
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table EA10: Replication of Table 2: Ideological Extremes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West East: WP East: EP East: MP
b b b b
Left-wing 0.43∗∗∗ 0.13+ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.06
(0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Left-wing extremist 0.23∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03 0.55∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
Center 0.08∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.07
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
Right-wing extremist -0.03 -0.12 0.28∗∗∗ 0.18
(0.04) (0.13) (0.07) (0.15)
Female 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.06 0.11+
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 1.35∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.09) (0.16)
Quite interested in politics 0.98∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
Hardly interested 0.52∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
TU member 0.32∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
Democratic satisfaction -0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04 0.08+ 0.01
(0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Constant -2.22∗∗∗ -3.45∗∗∗ -3.88∗∗∗ -2.37∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.20) (0.15) (0.25)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163830 16279 33781 10714
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.06
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Extremists are respondents with extreme
values (0,10) on the left-right scale.
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Table EA11: Replication of Table 2: Clustered Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West East: WP East: EP East: MP
b b b b
Left-wing 0.45∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ -0.27∗ -0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07)
Center 0.09∗∗∗ -0.15 -0.42∗∗∗ -0.09
(0.02) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Female 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.06 0.10
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.13)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.07∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Very interested in politics 1.36∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.15) (0.16)
Quite interested in politics 0.98∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.17) (0.18)
Hardly interested 0.51∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.39∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.15)
TU member 0.32∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07)
Democratic satisfaction -0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.04∗∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04 0.08 0.02+
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01)
Constant -2.21∗∗∗ -3.46∗∗∗ -3.83∗∗∗ -2.32∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.47) (0.20) (0.42)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163830 16279 33781 10714
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.06
Note: Logistic regressions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
12
Table EA12: Replication of Table 3: Continuous L/R scale, reduction of inc. inequalities
West East: Western Pattern East: Eastern Pattern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b b b b b b
L/R scale 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
L/R scale × Cultural liberalism -0.29∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.10∗
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
Reduce inequality 0.47∗∗∗ 0.55 -0.09
(0.11) (0.47) (0.26)
Reduce inequality × Cultural liberalism -1.44∗∗∗ -1.11 0.53
(0.17) (0.75) (0.43)
Cultural liberalism 3.01∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗ 2.35∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.32+
(0.11) (0.07) (0.35) (0.27) (0.29) (0.18)
Female 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.07 0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (in years) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Very interested in politics 1.25∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10)
Quite interested in politics 0.94∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
Hardly interested in politics 0.53∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08)
TU member 0.32∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Democratic satisfaction -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.01 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ideol. opponent of the incumbent 0.09∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant -3.27∗∗∗ -2.92∗∗∗ -4.65∗∗∗ -4.25∗∗∗ -4.71∗∗∗ -3.96∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.33) (0.29) (0.24) (0.19)
ESS wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 110944 110089 9563 9475 23005 22748
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10
Note: Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
+ p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. For a visual presentation of the results
see Figures EA2 & EA3.
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Figure EA1: Replication of Figure 4 (Continuous L/R scale)
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Note: Replication of Figure 4 using the continuous version of L/R scale. Based on Table EA6. 95 %
confidence intervals.
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Figure EA2: Replication of Figure 4 (Support for reduction of income inequalities)
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Note: Replication of Figure 4 using support for reduction of income inequalities instead of the
left/right categories. Based on Table EA12. 95 % confidence intervals.
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Figure EA3: Replication of Figure 4 (EP pattern without Hungary)
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Note: Replication of Figure 4 (East: EP) without Hungary. 95 % confidence intervals.
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Table EA13: Scalability coefficient H by country (ESS and EVS Data)
Country ESS EVS
Austria 0.56 0.73
Belgium 0.56 0.70
Bulgaria 0.58 0.40
Croatia 0.80 0.79
Czech Rep. 0.67 0.65
Denmark 0.57 0.56
Estonia 0.40 0.41
Spain 0.50 0.46
Finland 0.72 0.71
France 0.60 0.69
Germany 0.58 0.69
Great Britain 0.78 0.85
Greece 0.47 NA
Hungary 0.47 0.72
Ireland 0.64 0.75
Iceland 0.59 0.68
Italy 0.51 NA
Latvia NA 0.40
Lithuania 0.49 0.56
Luxembourg 0.45 NA
Netherlands 0.59 0.72
Norway 0.60 NA
Poland 0.57 0.49
Portugal 0.44 0.54
Romania NA 0.34
Sweden 0.65 0.70
Switzerland 0.74 NA
Slovenia 0.46 0.56
Slovakia 0.66 0.66
Note: “NA” means that the country was not used in the analysis due to missing data in (some or
all) waves of the given survey.
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Table EA14: Descriptive statistics: EVS
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Protest participation 234347 0.270 0.440 0 1
Left-wing 234796 0.320 0.470 0 1
Center 234796 0.330 0.470 0 1
L/R scale 234796 5.090 2.170 0 10
Reduce inequality 232169 0.290 0.260 0 1
Female 234561 0.520 0.500 0 1
Age 233873 49.96 17.32 18 123
Education (in years) 232736 12.55 4.090 0 56
Democratic satisfaction 230586 5.320 2.440 0 10
Very interested in politics 234345 0.120 0.320 0 1
Quite interested in politics 234345 0.390 0.490 0 1
Hardly interested in politics 234345 0.350 0.480 0 1
Not at all interested in politics 234345 0.140 0.350 0 1
TU member 232108 0.210 0.410 0 1
Ideological opponent of the incumbent cabinet 234793 0.320 0.470 0 1
Table EA15: Descriptive statistics: ESS
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Protest participation 102112 0.470 0.500 0 1
Left-wing 106869 0.460 0.500 0 1
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Note on the Political Patterning in Hungary and Poland
The political spaces of Poland and Hungary were in flux in the 1990s,
but stabilized towards the end of the decade. We assess this development
by considering party and voter placement on economic and cultural issues
among the most significant parties of Hungary and Poland, using the Man-
ifesto Project Data (Volkens et al., 2018), the Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES) data (Bakker et al., 2015, Polk et al., 2017), World and European
Values Surveys, and the 1994 Hungarian Election Study (Klingemann and
Toka, 1998).
Figures EA4 and EA5 show the over-time positional change of Hun-
garian and Polish parties. On economic issues, the dispersion of party
placements decreases dramatically over the 1990s. This is particularly pro-
nounced in Hungary, where by 2005 economic positions of major parties
are hardly distinguishable. By the 2000s, the major right-wing competi-
tors (Fidesz in Hungary, and PiS in Poland) are frequently to the left of
the major left-wing parties (MSzP in Hungary, and SLD in Poland).
19
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Figure EA4: Hungarian party developments
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Figure EA5: Polish party developments
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On the cultural dimension, both countries manifest an initial spike in
cultural liberalism (among almost all major parties) in the early 1990s,
followed by a significant shift to cultural conservatism by the second half
of the decade. This shift is, however, most significant and lasting on the
part of the right-wing parties. By the 2000s, it is the left parties (MSzP
and SLD) that dominate the culturally liberal pole, while the major right-
wing competitors (Fidesz and PiS) dominate the culturally conservative
end of the spectrum.
We can also see the formation of this space by examining the placement
of parties and mean voters on the economic and cultural dimensions, de-
picted in figures EA4 and EA5. Here we see that in both countries the ma-
jor left and liberal parties remain consistently placed. The ex-communist
parties (MSzP and SLD) take statist and culturally moderately liberal
positions, while liberal parties (SzDSz and UD/UW) take up market eco-
nomic and culturally liberal stances.
22
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Figure EA6: Hungarian political space
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Figure EA7: Polish political space
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It is the major right parties whose positions are less fixed during the
1990s. In the early period, we see the Hungarian right dominated by the
Christian Democratic and nationalist MDF, which throughout the 1990s
seems to take distinctly pro-market economic positions, while being cul-
turally conservative. Fidesz initially stands near, but to the statist side
of the liberals, taking culturally liberal, but only moderate pro-market
positions. This situation changes towards the late 1990s as MDF starts
to lose its electoral primacy on the right to Fidesz. During this period
Fidesz shifts significantly towards the culturally conservative end of the
spectrum, while simultaneously shifting towards economic statism. While
there is no clear competition patter that would connect the economic and
cultural dimension in the early 1990s, the later 1990s see the formation of a
connection between economic statism and cultural conservatism, positions
driven by Fidesz and later also the radical right Jobbik.
In Poland the right is initially fragmented between the liberals (UD/UW),
and various Christian factions. These Christians tend towards moderate
cultural conservatism, but initially seem to be relatively pro-market ori-
ented. As in Hungary, this changes in the late 1990s as the Electoral Action
Solidarity (AWS) an umbrella grouping for the Christian right shifts to-
wards the economic center, and eventually splinters. This splintering leads
to the creation of a more liberal Civic Platform (PO), and a more Christian
nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS). This fragmentation solidifies the
patterning of Polish politics between economically statist cultural conser-
vatives dominated by PiS, and more culturally liberal economic centrists
(SLD, RP) or free marketeers (PO).
In sum, while the Hungarian and Polish systems demonstrate initial
tendencies towards cultural liberalism on the part of the right-wing par-
ties, this liberalism is short-lived, and eclipsed by the (relative) liberalism
of the major ex-communist left-wing competitors and liberals. Simultane-
ously, there is a relative shift of the major right-wing competitors to the
economically statist positions, which are often more statist than (or hard
25
to distinguish from) the positions of the socialist parties. By the late 1990s
and early 2000s, this consequently produces a political space connecting
statist economic positions (often associated with nominally ‘right-wing’
parties) with cultural conservatism, while pro-market stances are associ-
ated with cultural liberals. Hungary and Poland thus ultimately follow
the eastern pattern.
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